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Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis 
 




During the July Crisis, the United Kingdom was put under strong pressure from 
Russia and the latter’s ally, France, to declare it would fight alongside them. Britain 
had made the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 
1907. The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George Buchanan, was the key 
figure in diplomatic communication between Britain and Russia at this time and his 
performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Some analysts believe he 
genuinely sought to restrain Russia from war, but was undermined by his own 
government, who too easily accepted St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. But 
others feel Buchanan’s reports of Russian mobilisation were ill-informed and 
unhelpful to the government in London. This article examines Buchanan’s 
performance, arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not 
deserve some of the criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the 
Triple Entente was a priority for him and, after about 28 July, once it became clear 
that European war could not be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia’s war 
preparations, appearing more interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in 





In late June 1914, at an embassy dinner in the presence of foreign minister Sergei 
Sazonov, Britain’s ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, expressed confidence that 
Anglo-Russian friendship had ‘taken such root that it will be able to weather all the 
storms that may beat round it in the future.’1 Days later, the heir to the Austro-
Hungarian throne was assassinated by a Bosnian Serb. Sir Arthur Nicolson, 
Buchanan’s predecessor in Russia, now Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign 
Office (FO), hoped this would ‘not lead to any further complications…’2 But on 23 
July, a series of harsh demands was made by the Austro-Hungarian government 
against its Serbian neighbour. There followed nine days of intense diplomacy – with 
Russia backing Serbia, while Germany supported Austria-Hungary – before, on 1 
August, Germany declared war on Russia, heralding a European conflict. During this 
time, the United Kingdom was pressed by Russia and the latter’s ally, France, to 
declare it would fight beside them. Britain had made the entente cordiale with France 
in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 1907. Both focused on resolving differences 
in the imperial sphere, but they had serious implications for Europe, where Berlin 
feared encirclement by the ‘triple entente’, while Paris and St. Petersburg expected 
support in diplomatic crises.  
 
Buchanan’s performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Two 
early analysts, Harry Barnes and Sidney Fay, believed he genuinely sought to restrain 
Russia from war, but was undermined by his own government, who too easily 
accepted that St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. 3 Recently, however, it has been 
claimed Buchanan’s reports of Russian mobilisation ‘were about as ill-informed as 
diplomatic dispatches could be.4 This essay will examine Buchanan’s performance, 
arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not deserve some 
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criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Triple Entente was a 
personal priority and, in late July, once it became clear that European war could not 
be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia’s war preparations, appearing more 
interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in providing an accurate analysis of 
events. This was significant because, in 1914, in the absence of strong international 
organisations, with summit conferences (and even foreign ministers’ meetings) a 
rarity and communications relayed by telegraph, ambassadors were highly significant 
in shaping information flows to their home government and thereby influencing 
decision-making. British diplomats may have lacked ‘the authority and independence 
which could be accumulated by French ambassadors’, but commanded greater respect 
than their German counterparts, who were, ‘with few exceptions, not trusted 
lieutenants but rather orderlies of superior figures who allowed them little 
independence…’ Nicolson’s case confirms Zara Steiner’s judgement that Britain’s 
ambassadors were ‘restricted in [their] attitudes and interests’, but challenges her 
conclusion that their ‘room for manouevre was small and the post-war debate about 
the responsibility of the diplomats for the outbreak of the war has a curiously artificial 
air about it.’5  
 
Buchanan was the key source of information for Britain about Russian 
intentions during the July crisis. The Russian ambassador in London, Count 
Alexander Benckendorff, in post since 1902, was an efficient diplomat and an 
anglophile, well-connected in high society and respected in the Foreign Office.6 But 
he only met with Grey three times after the crisis broke: on 25 and 27 July, he pressed 
for a warning to Germany that Britain would enter the war; on 30 July he set out 
Sazonov’s position on peace talks, which had already been reported to London by 
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Buchanan. Understandably, Benckendorff’s priority was to ensure British intervention 




It has been said that, with his ‘monocle, his finely-chiselled features, and his beautiful 
silver-grey hair’, Buchanan, posted to St. Petersburg in 1910, had ‘something of the 
appearance of a stage-diplomat.’8 The son of Sir Andrew Buchanan, himself a 
successful Victorian ambassador, George first served under his father in Vienna in 
1876, then gained experience in Germany and Italy, before becoming British envoy to 
Bulgaria, a post that familiarised him with the intricacies of Balkan politics. The 
former Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Hardinge, was confident George would be 
successful in St. Petersburg, ‘as he is a gentleman and quite sensible although not 
overburdened with brains.’9 Robert Bruce Lockhart, Acting Consul-General in 
Moscow, felt Buchanan was ‘no Russian scholar’ and ‘not a man of outstanding 
intellect… [but] he had remarkable powers of intuition and an abundant supply of 
common sense. To Russian cleverness he opposed complete honesty and sincerity 
tempered with caution.’10  Whatever his cultural separation from the Russians, he 
remained in St. Petersburg until 1918. A particular success was to build a friendly 
working relationship with Sazonov.11  
 
One of his staff recalled that, ‘Both morally and physically [Buchanan] was 
the soul of modest courage… he kept to a middle register of imperturbable serenity’, 
though he also had an other-worldly quality: 
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I don’t think Sir George knew what he was eating or drinking himself... He 
was too deep sunk in thought, thinking over… his morning talk with the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, planning his despatches and telegrams....12 
This illuminates Michael Hughes’ point that Buchanan’s ‘detached manner was at 
least in part simply a product of chronic absent-mindedness and shyness.’13 A less 
flattering picture emerges from Somerset Maugham, an intelligence officer in wartime 
Russia who, in his Ashenden stories, based the character of Sir Herbert Witherspoon 
on Buchanan. When they were first introduced, Ashenden ‘was received with a 
politeness to which no exception could be taken, but with a frigidity that would have 
sent a little shiver down the spine of a polar bear.’ Later, having been invited to 
dinner, Ashenden ‘would have been more interested if the Ambassador had not so 
invariably said the right, wise and sensible thing upon every topic that was 
introduced.’ Yet, despite repeated references to Witherspoon’s coldness, Maugham is 
clear he was ‘not an ordinary person’: 
He knew how to be determined when determination was necessary and 
conciliatory when conciliation was opportune. His manners were perfect… he 
had a clear and logical brain. He was never afraid to think his thoughts out to 
the end, but was wise enough to suit his actions to the exigencies of the 
situation.14 
 
Anglo-Russian relations in mid-1914 
Despite the 1907 Convention, there were persistent Anglo-Russian tensions, caused 
by rivalries in central Asia (especially over their relative influence in Persia) and 
criticism of the authoritarian Tsarist regime from the ruling British Liberal Party. Tsar 
Nicholas II and Sazonov were disappointed with Britain’s lukewarm support during 
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the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s reluctance to 
transform the entente into a military alliance. Most analysts see Grey as pursuing a 
balanced approach between Russia and Germany in early 191415, although Keith 
Wilson argues the Foreign Secretary was always likely to side with Russia in a crisis, 
largely because of the potential threat it posed to British interests in Asia, including 
India.16 Thomas Otte points out there were differences of emphasis within the FO, 
with Nicolson keen to work closely with St. Petersburg, while the Assistant Under-
Secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, was less willing to overlook Russian excesses in Persia.17 
In his memoirs, Buchanan was keen to portray himself as a strong supporter of the 
entente, quoting a February 1914 telegram, in which he said there was ‘a good deal of 
truth in Sazonoff’s contention that, if Germany knew beforehand that France and 
Russia could count on England’s support, she would never face the risks which such a 
war would entail.’18 Other evidence, however, suggests he was uncertain of Russian 
goodwill. In March 1914, he warned Nicolson that Russia only needed British support 
while completing her current armaments programme: ‘her eventual attitude towards 
us will depend on whether we stand firmly by her in any crisis which may arise during 
the intervening years.’19 But both documents pointed to a belief Britain must stand by 
its entente partners in any war crisis. This was only to be expected, given that 
Buchanan’s appointment was backed by Nicolson and Hardinge, who were both 
suspicious of Germany and keen to work closely with Russia.20 Furthermore, Lady 
Buchanan was sister to the 7th Earl Bathurst, owner of The Morning Post, a right-wing 
daily newspaper that also backed the entente. As the July Crisis broke, its editor 
believed that, ‘Germany thinks her time has come to challenge France and Russia.’21 
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Significantly, before the crisis, Buchanan and the FO were hoping to extend 
the 1907 Convention, a course beset by uncertainty. A tentative agreement by Grey, in 
April, to open discussions on an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, was a positive sign, 
but there remained serious differences over Persia.22 In early July 1914, the main 
concern in Anglo-Russian relations was not the assassination at Sarajevo, which 
initially seemed unlikely to provoke conflict, but the prospect of restoring the Russian 
entente to good health. This order of priorities is revealed in a letter the Ambassador 
sent to Nicolson on 9 July. Only at the end did Buchanan comment on Sarajevo, 
simply remarking, ‘Now the first feeling of horror evoked by the assassination… has 
passed away, the general impression would seem to be one of relief that so dangerous 
a personality should have been removed from the succession…’ The bulk of the letter 
concerned Anglo-Russian relations in Asia. Buchanan reported that, two days earlier, 
seeking to allay British fears that Russia might invade India, Sazonov had raised the 
idea of a mutual Anglo-Russian guarantee of the inviolability of their Asian 
possessions. To prevent Japan – a British ally since 1902 – being offended by this, he 
was willing to bring Tokyo in to a tripartite guarantee. The Ambassador was so taken 
aback by this unexpected offer, he doubted Sazonov’s seriousness. Buchanan also told 
Nicolson of France’s keen desire to resolve differences over Persia between their 
entente partners. The French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, had said President 
Raymond Poincaré, who was due in St. Petersburg for a state visit on 20 July, would 
make it ‘one of the chief subjects of conversation’ with the Russians.23  On 19 July, 
Sazonov repeated the offer of a tripartite Anglo-Russian-Japanese guarantee; Grey 
told Buchanan he was ‘personally attracted’ to this, but could only pursue it when ‘the 
Parliamentary and Irish situation’ gave time to do so.24  
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On 23 July, at the end of Poincaré’s state visit, Buchanan’ s report to Nicolson 
was still largely devoted to Anglo-Russian differences over Persia, French efforts to 
overcome these and hopes of a new Convention. Poincaré and the French team ‘seem 
to have discussed the whole question at length’ with Sazonov and were ‘quite 
satisfied with what he told them’, so Buchanan concluded, ‘The present is, I think, a 
propitious moment for trying to settle all these outstanding questions…’ As to the 
Balkans situation, Buchanan felt Sazonov would ‘make no difficulties’ if Austrian 
demands on Serbia were moderate; although, if Vienna adopted ‘an aggressive 
attitude towards Servia, Russia will sooner or later be forced to intervene in one way 
or another.’ Buchanan was no more specific than this, however, and also reported on 
‘a series of very bad strikes during the week.’ The letter, written on the day Austria 
delivered its fatal ultimatum to Serbia, barely hinted that war might be imminent.25 
 
The Crisis begins, 18-24July 
It was not that Buchanan was unaware of potential problems. On 8 July, Grey had 
expressed fears to Ambassador Benckendorff of a possible Austrian ‘démarche with 
regard to Servia’ and worried that leaked reports about tentative Anglo-Russian naval 
conversations could ‘lead the German authorities to think that some coup was being 
prepared against Germany.’26 But little happened on an Anglo-Russian plane until ten 
days later when, in conversation with Buchanan, Sazonov expressed ‘great 
uneasiness’ over Austro-Serbian tensions, warning, ‘anything in the shape of an 
Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent, and she might be 
forced to take some precautionary military measures.’27 Grey hoped such escalation 
could be avoided, telling Buchanan, ‘If Austrian demands in [sic] Servia are kept 
within reasonable limits… I hope every attempt will be made to prevent any breach of 
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the peace’; the ambassador might suggest, ‘Austria and Russia should discuss things 
together if they become difficult.’28 
 
Buchanan, along with other ambassadors, had met Poincaré briefly at the 
Winter Palace during a diplomatic reception on 21 July. The Frenchman – rather like 
Maugham – found the British envoy ‘exquisitely courteous if a little cold.’29 Poincaré 
had already discussed Persia with the Tsar and said the Russians were prepared to 
address their differences with Britain. More significant in the immediate term, 
Buchanan told Poincaré of an earlier conversation with the Serbian minister, Miroslav 
Spalajković, who feared Austria ‘would create some incident’ to justify an attack on 
his country. This helped set the scene for a tense encounter that immediately 
followed. between the President and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. Buchanan’s 
report to London adds that Poincaré was opposed to bilateral Austro-Russian talks on 
the Balkans, feeling these ‘would be very dangerous at present’. Frustratingly, the 
President’s reasons for believing this are unstated, but it scotched Grey’s suggestion 
of such talks. Poincaré said he preferred to see ‘moderating counsels by France and 
England at Vienna’, thereby revealing a desire to draw Britain onto the Russian side 
in diplomatic exchanges. Later, Buchanan talked to Sazonov, who also wanted the 
three entente powers ‘to counsel moderation at Vienna.’30 A French telegram reveals 
Buchanan had said Britain would support a demarche in Vienna – an indication, 
perhaps, of his readiness to stand by the entente during the crisis.31 In London, 
however, there was scepticism, even from pro-entente officials, about putting pressure 
on Austria. Crowe felt it was ‘for the German government to do this’ and Nicolson 
that it ‘would be resented and would do harm.’32 But Russian and French pressure on 
Britain for joint action would continue over the coming days. As Otte comments, this 
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was far from unprecedented: St. Petersburg and Paris had long sought ‘to bind 
London more firmly to the Franco-Russian alliance and the idea of joint diplomatic 
initiatives had been their preferred policy tool during previous Balkan crises.’33 
 
While Russian leaders did not seek war over the following days, their concern 
over national prestige and growing suspicion of Germany made them determined to 
show resolve, primarily through mobilisation – a dangerous tactic that increased the 
danger of war.34 On Friday morning, 24 July, Buchanan was ‘musing on all that I was 
going to do during my approaching holiday’, when he was telephoned by Sazonov, 
who had seen the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, feared its harsh demands 
‘meant war’ and asked to the Ambassador to meet at the French embassy. Here, 
Sazonov and Paléologue emphasised that, during the state visit, they had re-affirmed 
their alliance, established a ‘perfect community of views’ on international problems 
and agreed to counsel Vienna against any demand amounting to ‘an attack on 
[Serbia’s] sovereignty…’ Sazonov, who had evidently on a hard line against Austria, 
then pressed Britain to show ‘solidarity with France and Russia’ in the face of 
Vienna’s ‘immoral and provocative demands’, while Paléologue ‘gave me to 
understand that France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but 
would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance.’ Faced 
by such pressure, Buchanan remained calm. He ‘could personally hold out no hope 
that [Britain] would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail engagement 
to support France and Russia by force of arms’, especially since Britain had ‘no direct 
interests in Servia’, and bluntly asked if Russia was contemplating war. Sazonov 
replied this could only be decided after discussion in the Council of Ministers, but 
‘thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilise.’ 
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After lunch, Sazonov and Paléologue continued to press Buchanan ‘to declare 
our complete solidarity with them’, the Frenchman insisting that ‘a firm and united 
attitude was our only chance of averting war’. From Paléologue’s language, ‘it almost 
looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we 
declined to join them.’ Buchanan, suggested to them, that Grey might press Vienna 
and Berlin about the ‘danger to European peace of an Austrian attack on Serbia’, 
including a statement that this ‘would in all probability force Russia to intervene, that 
this would bring Germany and France into the field and that, if war became general, it 
would be difficult for England to remain neutral.’35 Douglas Newton believes that, in 
saying this, Buchanan showed he ‘clearly sympathised with Sazonov and 
Paléologue.’36 In contrast, Luigi Albertini thinks ‘Buchanan’s language was… 
temperate and conciliatory’, and Grey ought to have taken up his idea of giving 
‘Vienna and Berlin a warning of the consequences which a war with Serbia might… 
bring in its train.’37 Sean McMeekin, too, judges that, if Grey had followed 
Buchanan’s advice on issuing a warning to Germany, Berlin ‘would have been under 
no illusions about British neutrality’ and might have dissuaded Austria from declaring 
war on Serbia.38 But Otte argues that, at this point, Grey was focused on persuading 
Berlin, by friendly advice rather than threats, to restrain Vienna; Grey also warned the 
German ambassador that any extreme Austrian action would provoke a Russian 
response.39  
 
Buchanan’s telegram did have some effect on thinking in London, however. A 
copy was sent by Prime Minister Henry Asquith to his confidante Venetia Stanley, 
‘because it shows… how even at this stage Russia is trying to drag us in.’40 Ministers 
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received a copy and, according to one, in Cabinet, Grey, ‘in his own quiet way’ said it 
raised the issue of whether Britain should stand by its entente partners.41 On his copy, 
Lewis Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, underlined those sentences where Buchanan 
suggested ‘it would be difficult for England to remain neutral…’42 Meanwhile, in the 
FO, Crowe used the telegram to insist that, with France and Russia determined to 
stand up to Germany, what mattered was to deter Berlin from war by giving the 
impression Britain might fight. Crowe agreed with Sazonov that, ‘sooner or later 
England will be dragged into war if it does come.’ To this, Nicolson added – his logic 
strikingly close to Buchanan’s – ‘Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by 
Russia as a test and we must be most careful not to alienate her.’43 As Otte points out, 
the problem is that, in relying on what Buchanan reported about strong French support 
for Russia, the FO relied in turn on how Paléologue interpreted his country’s policy. 
But the French ambassador was something of a maverick, who did not accurately 
reflect the moderate line Paris wanted or report home fully on the Russian 
preparations for war.44 
 
  Grey was content with Buchanan’s performance in the 24 July meetings, 
saying he had spoken ‘rightly in very difficult circumstances’ and adding, ‘I do not 
consider that public opinion here would… sanction our going to war in the Servian 
quarrel.’ The Foreign Secretary had registered Buchanan’s mention of military 
preparations, however, noting it was ‘almost inevitable that in [a] very short time 
Austria and Russia will both have mobilised against each other.’ In such 
circumstances, Grey now told Buchanan the best option for peace was talks between 
the other four Great powers – Britain, German, France and Italy – to explore a 
settlement. It was vital Germany should take part, as an ally of Austria, so that 
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mediation seemed impartial. Meanwhile, Austria and Russia, if they mobilised, should 
not send troops across their borders.45 This last point was, as Albertini says, ‘a most 
dangerous thing to say. Instead of restraining St. Petersburg, this was the very thing to 
drive it forward.’ It undermined Buchanan’s cautious line towards Sazonov and failed 
to recognise the danger of a violent German response to any Russian mobilisation.46 
But Grey, who was no military expert, evidently failed to realise the implications of 
mobilisation, believing it to be more important that armies, once mobilised, did not 
invade their neighbours. He was clearly also unwilling to deter Germany by aligning 
closely with Russia and France. His failure to take such a step was taken up, both by 
the Conservative opposition at home and by later historians, who argued (like 
Sazonov) that a stark warning to Berlin might have deterred it from risking war.47 
 
War Preparations, 25-28 July 
On the 25th, Buchanan was again invited to meet with Sazonov and Paléologue, 
describing this as having ‘resumed our conversation of the preceding day.’48 Sazonov 
said he was willing to see efforts by Britain, France, Germany and Italy with a view to 
finding a peaceful settlement (and he seems to have come up with this idea 
independently of Grey.) Nonetheless, ominously, he warned that an order had been 
drafted for mobilisation and, while this would only be published if it became 
necessary, ‘preliminary preparations for mobilisation would… begin at once.’ 
Buchanan hoped Russia would not mobilise before Grey had a chance to work for 
peace and reasoned Britain could best play the ‘role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna 
to better purpose as [a] friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, 
might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia’s 
ally at once.’ But Sazonov replied that Germany was counting on British neutrality, 
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Austria aimed at establishing hegemony in the Balkans at Russia’s expense and, ‘If 
we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war.’ Paléologue 
also urged British support. Sidestepping these arguments, Buchanan – with what one 
of his diplomatic colleagues later called ‘prophetic foresight’49 – warned that, if 
Russia mobilised, Germany would not give her time to carry this out, ‘but would 
probably declare war at once.’ In this, he certainly showed more prescience than 
Grey. But Sazonov, assured by Paléologue of French support, seemed ready to take 
the risk and Buchanan warned Grey that London might soon have to ‘choose between 
giving Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we 
cannot hope to maintain that friendly cooperation with her in Asia that is of such vital 
importance to us’50 Buchanan’s account is ambiguous as to whether this was his own 
conclusion or whether, during the meeting, Sazonov had made a threat on these 
lines.51 If the Russian did make the threat it was, as Keith Wilson says, ‘bleak 
blackmail’.52 
 
This telegram showed Buchanan was aware of the dangers presented by 
Russian mobilisation, including the possibility it might provoke war, and clearly 
warned London that pre-mobilisation measures were being taken. However, he may 
also have under-emphasised his sympathy with the Franco-Russian case. According to 
Paléologue’s (admittedly, sometimes unreliable) memoirs, when warned by the 
Frenchman of German ambitions, Buchanan, ‘with a weary smile’ declared, ‘You 
know you are preaching to the converted.’53 In his telegrams to Paris, Paléologue 
regularly failed to mention Buchanan’s cautious advice, instead emphasising his 
sympathy for the entente.54 But Buchanan’s moderation was undermined in other 
ways, not least – ironically – by Grey. That morning Count Benckendorrf, had pressed 
 15 
the Foreign Secretary to ‘give some indication to Germany… we would not stand 
aside if there was a war’, to which Grey replied that he had spoken to the German 
ambassador ‘on the assumption that Russia would mobilise…’, adding, ‘In effect, I 
was asking that, if Russia mobilised against Austria, the German government… 
should ask Austria to consider some modification to her demands…’ Once 
Benckendorff reported this home, the Russian government could only feel Grey 
approved mobilisation.55 Nonetheless, Buchanan’s report had some positive impact. 
Sazonov’s willingness to approve four-power talks led Nicolson to put make practical 
preparations for these, by preparing telegrams to the major European capitals.56  
 
There can be no doubt Buchanan was well-disposed to the Russian case. On 
26 July, he advised Grey that any parliamentary statement he made should ‘show that 
if European peace in being endangered it is not Russia but Austria that is at fault....’57 
Yet Grey ignored this advice when addressing the House of Commons on 27 July, 
instead focusing on the need for four-power talks to avoid ‘the greatest catastrophe 
that has ever befallen the continent of Europe...’58 Nevertheless, Buchanan continued 
to follow his instructions to try to moderate Russian behaviour. On 26 July, he told 
Sazonov that, if Britain openly sided with Russia and France in the crisis, it would 
merely stiffen Germany’s attitude and lessen the chances of her restraining Austria. 
The Ambassador added that, to give Grey time for his peace efforts, Russian 
mobilisation should ‘be deferred as long as possible…’ and, if it began, Russian 
troops should be held on their side of the border. Once again, Sazonov urged Britain 
to proclaim ‘solidarity with France and Russia’ and he warned that the order for 
mobilisation might be given on the day Austria invaded Serbia.59 But the changeable 
Russian also showed some interest in negotiation: on 27 July, Paléologue told 
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Buchanan that Sazonov was thinking, again, of direct talks with Austria.60 Later that 
day, Buchanan himself found Sazonov ‘very conciliatory and more optimistic’, 
talking about a possible Austro-Serb settlement.61  
 
McMeekin’s criticises Buchanan for his supposed failure, around 26-27 July, 
to report clearly on Russian mobilisation: ‘Grey did not believe himself to be lying 
when he kept denying that Russia was mobilising. He had little to go on beyond the 
reports of his ambassador…’ But such criticisms seem mis-directed. For example, 
McMeekin claims that, on 26 July, when reporting on military preparations in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow, Buchanan believed these might simply be linked to strike 
activity. 62 In fact, after reporting the two regions to be in a ‘state of extraordinary 
protective activity’, he simply said this was ‘ostensibly in view of strikes’, before 
adding, ‘Strikes here are practically over and measure is doubtless connected with 
intending mobilisation.’63 McMeekin also complains that, in his evening report of 27 
July, Buchanan failed to mention mobilisation.64 But the Ambassador’s morning 
telegram had already mentioned the possibility of full mobilisation and warned when 
it was likely to take place. Furthermore, as seen above, Buchanan had reported 
‘preliminary preparations’ for mobilisation were already taking place. Indeed, by 27 
July, British national daily newspapers openly reported that Russia was mobilising 
five corps.65 
 
British officials, then, were hardly in ignorance of Russia’s military 
preparations. It has been seen that Grey accepted Russia would mobilise and even told 
Benckendorff this. Nicolson warned the German ambassador on 25 July, it would ‘be 
difficult and delicate for us to ask Petersburg not to mobilise at all… when Austria 
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was contemplating such a measure…’66 Now, with a greater sense of the dangers, 
Crowe minuted – on Buchanan’s morning telegram of 27 July – that Russia could not 
delay mobilising when this ‘can only become effective in something like double the 
time required by Austria and by Germany.’ This was the case even though he knew 
that, ‘If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned that Germany will do the same and as 
German mobilization is directed almost entirely against France, the latter cannot 
possibly delay her own…’ With Vienna apparently bent on war, ‘it would be neither 
possible nor just… to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilizing.’67 On the 
basis of Buchanan’s reports, military planners also understood what was afoot. On 25 
July, General Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, met Nicolson, 
who ‘showed me a despatch just in from Buchanan… [which] said that Russia would 
not tolerate Austria attacking Servia and would go to war to prevent it.’68 Grey later 
explained that, in addition to recognising that Russian mobilisation would be slower 
than Germany’s, he feared, ‘if we put pressure on Russia to keep the peace, she might 
answer “will you support us, if it comes to war?” And – to that question – he could 
not have given an affirmative answer.’69 
 
 
War begins, 28-31 July 
On 28 July, Nicolson penned a long letter to Buchanan. On the one hand, this 
complained about Sazonov’s rapid shifts of position on peace initiatives: over the last 
few days he had alternatively supported four-power talks, an Anglo-Italian mediation 
attempt and direct Austro-Russian negotiations. On the other hand, Nicolson could 
‘quite understand Russia not being able to permit Austria to crush Servia’ and 
‘foresaw as well as you did that this crisis might be taken by Russia as a test of our 
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friendship’; so, ‘were we to disappoint her all hope of a friendly and permanent 
understanding with her would disappear.’ While the British government could not yet 
‘give any decided engagements’, it had signalled to Berlin and Vienna that they could 
not bank on British neutrality. (He was particularly thinking of the decision to keep 
the main British battle fleets together after a trial mobilisation.) He ended by praising 
Buchanan for his ‘usual skilful and tactful manner’ in handling ‘a most difficult 
situation’.70 The letter suggested that, while not completely happy with Sazonov, 
London might yet take Russia’s side in war. 
 
That same day, as Buchanan later recalled, ‘things took a decided turn for the 
worse.’ Although Sazonov was planning to meet the Austrian ambassador, he 
returned to his earlier pessimism, again warning Buchanan that, on the ‘day that 
Austria crossed Servian frontier order for mobilization against Austria would be 
issued.’ He again insisted, the ‘only way to avert war was for [the British government] 
to let it be clearly known that they would join France and Russia.’71 On leaving 
Sazonov’s office, Buchanan met Paléologue and asked him to argue against any 
provocative Russian military steps. Significantly, Buchanan’s logic was that, ‘unless 
convinced that the whole responsibility for the war rested with Germany, British 
public opinion would never sanction our participation in it.’72 Nonetheless, despite the 
strong hint here that he favoured British intervention in war, Buchanan’s was still 
urging caution. Gordon Martel writes that, while he favoured a Russian alliance, he 
was ‘an experienced diplomat… careful not to encourage the Russians to believe that 
they could rely on British support under any circumstances.’73 Bernadotte Schmitt, 
too, felt Buchanan consistently sought to restrain Russia: ‘Very little comfort indeed 
was M. Sazonov able to get out of Sir George Buchanan.’74 But the situation became 
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much more difficult when, later that day, Austria declared war on Serbia. Buchanan 
quickly reported Russian infantry were ‘leaving Warsaw for frontier.’75 Crowe was 
deeply concerned, warning, ‘Unless the Russians now decide to pull away… we shall 
have the general war upon us very soon.’76   
 
On 29 July, Buchanan reported that Russia had ordered partial mobilization 
against Austria, though the situation did not seem hopeless. Sazonov told the 
Ambassador general mobilization had been avoided for fear of sparking a German 
response, troops would not immediately cross the border and four-power 
consultations could proceed.  Buchanan himself defended Russian behaviour when he 
met the German ambassador, Count Friedrich Pourtalès, insisting, ‘If Russia had not 
shown that she was in earnest by ordering mobilisation, Austria would have believed 
that she could go to any lengths…’77 Actually, at this point Buchanan may have been 
misled by Sazonov, who knew general mobilisation (against Germany as well as 
Austria) was being seriously considered by his government, and who probably, as Fay 
says, ‘wished to avoid alarming and alienating British opinion.’78 Then again, there 
was considerable confusion in St. Petersburg on 29 July about whether to initiate a 
general mobilisation, or merely a partial one, and Sazonov himself may not have 
grasped that mobilisation would likely mean war.79 But in London, again, the 
government was aware of the danger. According to the education minister, Jack 
Pease, Grey told the Cabinet on 29 July, ‘he would continue to urge mediation by as 
many Powers as he could – and restrain Russia who was mobilising from doing so 
opposite the German frontier.’80 Harcourt’s journal shows Buchanan’s reports were 
noted carefully in Cabinet: ‘Russia has s[ai]d she will mobilise if Austria declares war 
– before end of Cab. we heard Russia had mobilised in cert[ain] towns on her 
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southern frontier. Germany has sd. she will not mobilise unless Russia does so on her 
Western frontier.’81 
 
Events now moved rapidly. Around lunchtime on 30 July, Sazonov called in 
Buchanan and Paléologue, accused Germany of preparing for war and reported on 
two meetings with Pourtalès. In the first, the previous afternoon, ‘High words were 
exchanged on both sides’ over Austrian intentions; in the second, at 2 a.m., the 
German ‘broke down completely’, but Sazonov suggested a possible peace formula: 
Russia would end its military preparations if Austria agreed to ‘eliminate from her 
ultimatum points which violate [Serbian] sovereignty…’ There are difficulties with 
Sazonov’s record at this point. First, he had actually held four meetings with Pourtalès 
since the afternoon of 29 July; only in the fourth, on the morning of 30 July, did he 
write down the proposed peace formula.82  Second, the assertion that Germany was 
actively preparing for war is contestable: Berlin had not ordered mobilisation and its 
pre-mobilisation measures were arguably equivalent to preparations Russia had been 
making for several days. But, criticisms of Buchanan can also be made at this point. 
McMeekin, who thinks Sazonov’s arguments were designed to justify Russian 
mobilisation, emphasises that, ‘If Buchanan had any suspicions about what Sazonov 
was up to, he failed to express them – or report them to London.’83 Fay makes the 
telling point that, in contrast to his earlier pressure for restraint, Buchanan ‘evidently 
made no effort to deter Sazonov from… general mobilization; his failure to do so 
must have been an encouragement to the Russian Minister.’84  
 
The Russians ordered general mobilisation later that day. Again, Henry 
Wilson’s diary shows London was kept well informed by Buchanan. On 30 July, he 
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recorded, ‘war seems to be inevitable. Sazonov and the German ambassador fell out 
last night and the German went to Sazonov’s house at 2 a.m. this morning in tears and 
said all was over.’85 True, Sazonov continued to give the impression he favoured 
peace. On 31 July, following a last-ditch plea from Grey, he gave Buchanan and 
Paléologue a revised peace formula, saying peace talks might begin if Austria-
Hungary did not let its forces march beyond Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, recognised the 
issue was ‘of European interest’ and respected Serbian sovereignty.86 By then, 
however, the crisis was moving beyond his control. Around 11 p.m., Pourtalés warned 
Sazonov that, if Russia did not halt its mobilisation by noon the following day, 
Germany would also mobilise.87  
 
As European war broke out, real criticisms can be made of Buchanan’s 
reporting, both in its promptness and accuracy. Until 28 July, despite his pro-Russian 
leanings, he had tried, in contrast to Paléologue, to moderate Russian behaviour and 
reported the main policy decisions soon after they occurred. But, his failure to ask 
serious questions about Sazonov’s claims during their 30 July meeting was, perhaps, 
an early indication that he now simply backed Russian war preparations. Two more 
episodes quickly followed, which together call into question his objectivity. First, 
Buchanan’s telegram reporting Russian general mobilization was only received in the 
FO at 5.20 p.m. on 31 July, almost 24 hours after the order was issued. This short 
telegram focused on the Russian government’s reasoning, ‘Austria is determined not 
to yield to intervention of powers and… is moving troops against Russia as well as 
against Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active 
military preparations…’ Before it arrived, London had already learnt of the 
mobilization from – embarrassingly – the Germans. A footnote in the official volume 
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of British Documents on the crisis, thinks it ‘most improbable’ he would have waited 
so long to report such an important event and suggests the date of despatch on the 
telegram is a day late. Such a mistake, it argues, could have been made by the clerk 
who copied the message (the original cyphered telegrams being routinely destroyed). 
Furthermore, delays in transmission became frequent late in the crisis, when 
telegrams from St. Petersburg were sent via Aden, other routes being deemed 
unreliable.88  
 
Albertini, however, after a detailed survey of the evidence, believed Buchanan 
probably did send the telegram on 31 July – after all, that is what date on the telegram 
says – and pointed out that the British military attaché was equally tardy, only sending 
his report about general mobilization during the afternoon of 1 August, even though 
mobilization notices had been publicly posted around St. Petersburg from 4 a.m. on 31 
July. Given Paléologue’s similar failure to report mobilisation quickly, Albertini 
raises the possibility there was ‘a conspiracy of silence between the representatives of 
the Triple Entente at St. Petersburg in regard to Russian general mobilization.’89 Less 
conspirational is William Jannen’s opinion: ‘Buchanan was never a man to move fast’ 
and may simply have acted ‘with his usual lackadaisical nonchalance’.90 As Otte 
argues with regard to Paléologue’s delay, a telegram could have been sent much more 
quickly: ‘Given that the red notices had been plastered all over St. Petersburg it was 
scarcely a secret, and there was no need now even for encyphering the telegram.’91 
The same point could be made about Buchanan. He might easily have sent an 
uncyphered telegram directly to London, given mobilization was open knowledge in 
Russia and he well knew that Germany might react violently to it.  
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Certainly, other telegrams got through quickly: one of 31 July was sent from 
St. Petersburg at 9.23 a.m. local time and arrived in London at 10.15 a.m.; one of 1 
August was sent at 7.30 a.m., arriving at 8.40 a.m.92 Furthermore, the editors of the 
British Documents are inconsistent with their arguments about telegrams going via 
Aden: a later footnote say this route was only used from 1 August.93 There is also 
another example of Buchanan’s reporting being suspiciously slow at this time. On the 
morning of 1 August, he and Paléologue had another meeting with Sazonov, who 
reported on meetings with the German and Austria ambassadors, which led Buchanan 
to conclude, ‘there now seems no chance of averting a general war unless German and 
France would agree, as Russia is ready to do, to keep their troops mobilised on their 
side of the frontier pending final attempt… at settlement.’ Yet this report was not 
even dispatched until 7.30 a.m. the following day.94 Buchanan’s two telegrams and the 
Military Attaché’s message do indeed suggest a pattern of slow reporting from St. 
Petersburg at a pivotal moment. 
 
The second episode that suggests Buchanan was, at the very least, dilatory in 
his duties, concerns his handling of a last-minute British bid for peace. About 1 a.m. 
on 1 August, following a disturbing midnight communication from the German 
embassy in London about how Russian mobilisation could provoke war, Asquith went 
to Buckingham Palace and had King George V approve a message to the Tsar, asking 
him – in rather convoluted terms - to ‘remove the misapprehension which I feel must 
have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace.’ 
The message was sent via Buchanan, who was instructed ‘at once [to] apply for an 
audience.’95 Although it was dispatched from London at 3.30 a.m., he claimed not to 
have received it until 5 p.m., an unusually long delay. Albertini admits this probably 
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made no difference: ‘it could not have arrived in time for Buchanan to read it 
decoded, to request and obtain an audience, make the journey to the Peterhof [palace], 
and be received by the Tsar before 11 a.m.’, the latest time when it might have made a 
difference. (The German ultimatum to Russia to halt its mobilisation expired at mid-
day.) Nonetheless, Albertini feels Buchanan ‘did not treat this important document 
with the urgency it deserved’ and ought to have sought an audience more rapidly. 
Furthermore, the Ambassador was inordinately slow in forwarding the Tsar’s reply to 
London: he had received this by about 2 a.m. on 2 August, but only sent it at 3.10 
p.m., that is more than twelve hours later. It arrived in London at 5.15 p.m., by which 
time continental war was unavoidable and debate focused on whether Britain should 
forcefully intervene. Albertini makes the intriguing argument that Buchanan, who had 
previously ‘endeavoured to restrain Sazonov from military measures’, was now 
behaving very differently: he may even have delayed the Tsar’s message, ‘lest it 
should adversely influence the decisions of his own country, of which he felt none too 
sure.’96  
 
Buchanan’s contemporary account, sent to Nicolson, claims attempts to 
arrange an audience began ‘at once’, but concedes he waited to receive a draft reply 
written up by Sazonov, before seeing the Tsar. Then, arriving at the Peterhof about 
10.45, Buchanan told the Tsar the draft reply was ‘couched in too official language’, 
so time was spent discussing the situation before the pair re-drafted it. Buchanan 
claimed he ‘virtually had to dictate the telegram… on the lines of the draft which 
Sazonow had given me and on what His Majesty told me.’ It all meant he was not 
back at the embassy until 2 a.m.97 Buchanan’s memoirs add that Sazonov had brought 
the initial draft to the embassy at 8 p.m., having already informed the Ambassador by 
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telephone about Germany’s declaration of war. Buchanan left the embassy at 9 p.m. 
but, ‘owing to something having gone wrong with the electric lights on my motor, the 
chauffeur took a wrong turn’, hence their late arrival at the Peterhof. Why, after 
returning to the embassy, he took so long to send the message off is simply left 
unexplained.98 
 
 The Tsar’s reply to King George, shaped by Buchanan, claimed ‘I would 
gladly have accepted your proposals’ had Germany not declared war; Russia ‘had 
devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution’, but Austria was determined 
‘to crush Servia.’ The Tsar had initially ordered a partial mobilisation, but was 
‘compelled’ to turn this into a general one because ‘of complete Austrian 
mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in 
Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made by Germany.’ The Tsar 
insisted ‘mobilization did not necessarily entail war…’, but hoped Britain would 
‘support France and Russia in fighting to maintain balance of power in Europe.’ 
Exactly how much of this was Buchanan’s work is difficult to guess, but he suggested 
no disagreement with any of it. He even added his own note, asserting, ‘if we do not 
respond to [the] Emperor’s appeal for our support, we shall at the end of the war… 
find ourselves without a friend in Europe, while our Indian Empire will no longer be 
secure from attack by Russia.’ This was very much in line with arguments Buchanan 
and Nicolson had made before the July crisis broke.99 Even Schmitt, usually a 
defender of the entente case, had to admit this message was ‘not altogether correct’ 
and that Russia acted before ‘complete Austrian mobilisation’, while the Tsar and 
Buchanan may have been ‘trying to make out as strong a case as possible for 
Russia…’100 Newton, who feels there was a general British failure to restrain Russia 
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during the crisis, accuses Buchanan of ‘stunningly imposing his own choices upon 
national decision-making’, by helping write the reply to George V.101 
 
It is possible that swifter reporting from St. Petersburg, especially if it had 
suggested Russia was behaving in a bellicose manner, might have influenced British 
decision-making. Not everyone in London shared the Buchanan-Nicolson outlook. 
The backbench Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee sent a resolution to Grey on 29 
July arguing that, ‘if both France and Russia were informed that on no account would 
we be drawn into war even though they and other European powers were involved it 
would have a moderating effect on their policy.’102 Lord Morley, one of two Cabinet 
ministers who resigned over the war, gave as his reason that, ‘To swear ourselves to 
France is to bind ourselves to Russia…’ He feared a victory for the entente would 
leave Russia ‘pre-eminent in Europe… Will that be good for Western civilisation? I 
don’t think so.’103 Horace Rumbold, the chargé d’affaires in Berlin, had ‘little 
patience with the Austrians and Russians ... the former were always d-d fools, the 
latter untrustworthy barbarians’; while Francis Bertie, the Ambassador to France, 
noted, ‘I cannot believe in war unless Russia wants it.’104 More important, there are 
signs Grey himself was not totally committed to Russia. Harcourt records that, in 
Cabinet on 31 July, Grey said he would get Germany to pressurise Austria ‘to make 
some reasonable offer to St. Petersburg and then if Russia proved unreasonable it 
might give us ground to wash our hands of Russia…’105 Following this, in the so-
called ‘misunderstanding’ of 1 August, Grey apparently raised with the German 
ambassador the possibility of Britain and France remaining neutral in the war, leaving 
Russia to fight alone.106  
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By now, however, Buchanan seems to have been primarily interested in 
defending the Russian case. After all, as he had told Paléologue a few days before, 
‘unless convinced that the whole responsibility for the war rested with Germany, 
British public opinion would never sanction our participation in it.’107 On 3 August, 
he wrote to Nicolson, reviewing the crisis. From the outset, the Russians ‘took up a 
firm attitude and made it perfectly clear that they would not allow Austria to crush 
Servia’, Paléologue showed ‘Russia could count on the support of France’ and 
Sazonov’s ‘anxiety had been what England would do.’ In contrast to Russia’s 
supposed reasonableness, there was ‘strong evidence to show that Germany really 
desired war, or at all events the disruption of the Triple Entente, which must have 
followed a failure on our part to support Russia.’ Buchanan summed up his own aim 
as having ‘been to dissuade [Sazonov] from doing anything to precipitate a conflict, 
so as to allow time for us and the other Powers to mediate; and if our efforts to 
maintain peace have failed it is in no way his fault.’ Buchanan made clear his own 
views of the policy London should adopt, in emotional terms: 
I only pray that England will prove true to herself and to her friends, as if she 
deserts them in their hour of need she will find herself isolated after the war; 
and the hours of our Empire will be numbered. 
Since he knew this letter might take days to reach London, it seems designed to put on 
record his own interpretation of events, defending Russia, blaming war on Germany 







Buchanan later recalled, in ‘the first three days of the war my position was not a 
pleasant one.’ His daughter, Meriel, found 3 August particularly difficult. ‘From the 
early morning till late at night people kept… coming to ask what England meant to 
do. Everybody is getting frightfully anxious about it and they all say that if they don’t 
settle soon there will be really serious rows.’ Meriel had absorbed Sazonov’s 
argument, soon to become a staple criticism of Grey’s behaviour during the crisis: 
If England from the beginning had been absolutely firm and said decidedly 
that if there was a war she would take part with Russia, Germany might not 
have had the courage to move in the way she has and the whole thing might 
still possibly have been averted. And England is bound to be dragged in at the 
end and it would serve her right if she was utterly defeated.109 
The following day, Britain was indeed ‘dragged in’ and, as Newton points out, the FO 
minimised uncomfortable questions about Russian policy and Buchanan’s behaviour. 
Officials doctored telegrams from Buchanan when compiling the White Paper on the 
crisis, to remove evidence that Sazonov and Paléologue had urged Britain to fight, 
emphasise Sazonov was open to peace talks and minimise evidence of the 
Ambassador’s desire for entente solidarity.110 
 
How, then, should Buchanan’s performance during the July Crisis be judged? 
Until Poincaré’s state visit, the Ambassador was focused on preparing for a possible 
re-negotiation of the Russian entente. He may be criticised for this, but it was a fault 
shared with some key officials at home, like Nicolson. In any case, Europe in general 
was taken aback by the scale of demands Austria made against Serbia on 23 July. 
Over the following days, Buchanan has generally been praised for resisting the joint 
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Franco-Russian pressure on Britain, which itself seems to have been decided during 
Poincare’s state visit. There is something to be said for Fay and Barnes’ case that 
Buchanan preached caution, only to be undermined by Grey’s clumsy acceptance of 
Russian mobilisation as an understandable, defensive step. Until 28 July, following 
his instructions, the Ambassador did urge Russia to negotiate, questioned the wisdom 
of mobilisation and resisted calls from Sazonov and Paléologue for Britain to align 
with them. His reporting at this point was more complete and honest than the French 
ambassador’s. McMeekin’s case that Buchanan’s reporting on mobilisation was 
inadequate around 26-27 July seems unfair. Buchanan may have been no military 
expert and his reports lacked detail, but Whitehall understood Russia was actively 
preparing for war, beginning with ‘preliminary preparations’. Until 28 July, Buchanan 
does seem to have shown the qualities of tact, honesty and imperturbability for which 
he had been chosen for his important post. He also seems to have had a clearer grasp 
of the implications of mobilisation than many politicians, including Grey and 
Sazonov. As Otte says, ‘Sazonov’s deterrence strategy, combining… mediation with 
military posturing, was deeply flawed.’111 But Buchanan predicted on 25 July that 
Russian mobilisation would lead Germany to strike. 
 
Yet, however cold Maugham and Poincaré found him, the Ambassador was 
not without deep emotions. Before the crisis, he shared Sazonov’s logic that Britain 
should side with its entente partners if Germany were to be deterred; he also feared 
Britain would have to join in a European war in the end. With such opinions, it is not 
surprising that he advised Grey, on 24 July, to warn Germany it might be difficult for 
Britain to remain neutral. Even as he preached caution to Sazonov, Buchanan 
continued to emphasise to Grey the need to preserve Russian friendship, not least to 
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safeguard British interests in Asia. Then, after 28 July, when Austria’s declaration of 
war on Serbia made a conflagration likely, the Ambassador focused on defending the 
Russian case. True, he may have been deliberately misled by Sazonov, especially in 
their 30 July conversation about partial mobilisation. Ponting calls Sazonov 
‘mendacious’, while Clark argues that, from 26 July, ‘the Russians deliberately 
concealed the extent of their “clandestine preparations” from… Buchanan...’112 But he 
hardly asked probing questions of the foreign minister and Albertini is surely right to 
sense that his reporting now became dilatory, perhaps deliberately starving London of 
information, rather like Paléologue. There may have been excuses for Buchanan’s late 
reporting of Russian mobilisation (it is possible his telegram was held up en route) 
and the delay in talking to the Tsar on 1 August (his car developing a technical fault). 
But this hardly explains why he became so slow at drafting messages, readily 
accepted Sazonov’s explanations of Russian policy and adopted a one-sided 
interpretation of events in his messages home, becoming a virtual apologist for Russia 
and undermining those in London who might have distanced themselves from her, 
had they been more fully informed. A possible psychological explanation of this is the 
so-called ‘Rubicon theory’: when decision-makers move from a ‘deliberative’ mind-
set (when different options are in play) to an ‘implemental’ one (when the key 
decision is taken), they tend to focus on a narrow goal – in Buchanan’s case ensuring 
British support for Russia – ignoring information which challenges their case and 
selecting only that which supports it.113 
 
In his memoirs, Buchanan continued to put the best possible light on Russian 
behaviour, asserting that, ‘Though Austria had already begun mobilising against 
Serbia on the 26th, it was only on the 28th that Russia took any preliminary steps for a 
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mobilization.’ In fact, Russia had been taking preliminary measures since 25 July. He 
also continued to justify Russia’s full mobilisation on the misleading grounds of ‘the 
extensive military operations… Germany was secretly making, as well as of the 
Austrian general mobilization.’114 Part of the responsibility for Buchanan’s behaviour 
in the last phase of the crisis may again lie with Grey, who chose not to be concerned 
about Russian mobilisation, did not ask the Ambassador for additional information 
and perhaps, as Clark claims, ‘subordinated his understanding of the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel to the larger imperatives of the entente…’115 Once the crisis was underway, 
Grey faced strong pressure from Nicolson and Crowe, as well as Buchanan, to stand 
by Russia. Then again, as Keith Neilson says, the impact of their advice on the 
Foreign Secretary ‘is uncertain since (he) remained largely aloof from his advisers’ at 
times and became more concerned about Cabinet divisions over intervention.116 On 1 
August, he even considered a deal to keep France neutral – leaving Russia alone to 
fight Germany. Viewed in that light, Buchanan may have allowed his own 
interpretation of British interests to override the imperative faced by any ambassador, 
to report as fully and accurately as possible on their host government’s policies, and 
so helped push London towards war on Russia’s side. 
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